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“An unexamined
life is not worth
living.”
— Socrates

CPE Director Robert Lawry he served on the advisory board
announced recently that Thomas for the Center for Professional
Ethics for five
Anderson has been
years.
appointed a Visiting
Ethics Fellow for
Most recently Tom
the
1998-99
took an unusual
academic year. The
two year career
appointment marks
hiatus in order to
Tom’s return to
pursue a Master’s
C.W.R.U. after an
Degree at the
absence of seven
Harvard Divinity
years. From 1977
School in their
to 1991, he held a
Center for the
variety of
Study of Values in
Tom
Anderson
administrative
Public Life.
positions at Case
Western, most importantly as Vice
President for Development and As a Visiting Ethics Fellow, Tom
Alumni Affairs from 1981 to 1991. will be an active participant in all
From 1991 to 1996, he was Vice of the Center’s activities, and will
President for Institute Relations at lead an exploration of Ethics and
the California Institute of Leadership with the 1525
Foundation’s 1996-1997 Ethics
Technology.
Fellows, all of whom are faculty
Tom Anderson met Bob Lawry in members at C.W.R.U.. In
1977 in a law class. “It was my addition to his work at the Center,
first meeting with Bob, and I really Tom will teach a course entitled,
enjoyed him as a teacher. That is “Ethics, Professionalism and
what really got me started on Leadership’’ at the Mandel Center
ethics,’’ says Tom. Because of for Non-Profit Organizations.
this relationship with Bob Lawry,

continued on page 8
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ROBERT P. LAWRY

% OFF BASE/ON BASE

rnest Hemingway once
advantage of us can push us to
allows for lots of nasty behav
compared life to a
the brink of mean-spiritedness,
ior.
baseball game. The
and even a little beyond. One
only difference, he suggested,
antidote for this may lie in
Two things must be kept sepa
was that the first time they
telling true stories about real
catch you off first base, they kill rate here. The first is the truth
people. I particularly like true
of falsity of Hemingway’s
you. He was not referring to
stories about real people, which
the baseball side on the analogy. observation. Well, it is hardly
show someone already antici
news that the world can be
pating
where the world might
inhospitable, corrupt, mean. At
Whether they kill you is true or
go awry; and meeting the
times, it is clearly savage. So
not as a metaphysical matter, it
challenge with uncommon
score one for Hemingway. On
serves well enough as a meta
the other hand, there is love and virtue, but also in a way that is
phor for the realists of the
shrewd and tough. An example
kindness and bravery. More to
world. Everybody has his or
of what I mean is a famous
the point, in most of our lives,
her story about the unfairness
story about Abraham Lincoln,
or the stupidity or the meanness the ugly stuff and the good stuff
the lawyer.
are often inextricably mixed
of the way the world goes,
together. So the second thing is
whether the world is an inhu
Once a client of Lincoln’s asked
to decide what to do about it.
mane bureaucracy or an inti
him to sue the client’s
Hobbes’
mate turned cmel. So the
hrother-in-law for
stark
realists teach cynicism. Their
defamation. Lincoln
“Everybody has
vision
advice is to lie, cheat, steal or
investigated the
makes
his or her story
take advantage first, otherwise
matter and concluded
most
you risk having someone do it
about the
that the client had a
people
to you before you even step off
unfairness or the
good case. Neverthe
uncom
first base.
less, Lincoln pleaded
stupidity or the
fort
with the man to be
meanness of the
able,
This attitude found philosophi
reconciled with his
way of the world
but it
cal expression in the work of
hrother-in-law, and
Ungers
goes....”
Thomas Hobbes, who said that
not to sue. Lincoln
as a
life without the protection of a
argued that the client
sour
totalitarian state was not only
himself
would
not want to
smell in the air, even for the
nasty, brutish and short, but
damage family relationships in a
best of us. Who wants to be
that there was no immorality in
way that this case was bound to
taken advantage of? Who
killing someone in anticipation
do. The client was adamant.
wants to he taken for a fool?
of the very possibility that they
Perhaps we don’t lie, cheat and He wanted to file suit. So
would kill you first. On the
Lincoln did file suit, and won
steal first; but any suggestion
more mundane level of daily
judgment for his client against
that someone may be taking
interactions, Hobbes’ position

E

continued on page 3
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On Base/Off Base
continued from page 2

the brother-in-law. Neverthe
less, Lincoln continued to urge
reconciliation, finally persuad
ing his client not to collect the
judgment won. Ultimately
the two relatives agreed that the
defendant would pay only costs
and Lincoln’s fee, which Lin
coln asked them to set together.
To me, this is a dazzling story
on many counts. First of all, it
shows Lincoln’s primary atti
tude about lawyering: seek
reconciliation before resorting
to litigation. Next, it shows
Lincoln’s toughness; he filed the
suit and won. Then there is
shrewdness tied directly back
into what lawyers should be
about. If the client could
actually reach agreement with
his brother-in-law on the issue
of Lincoln’s fee, the dispute
would be over and they would
be reconciled. Remember the
context here. Lincoln had a
winning case, and surely, a
sizable fee. Nevertheless, he
determined that the virtuous
lawyer puts some things ahead
of winning and financial gain.
He did not ultimately turn down
the case, bowing instead to his
client’s decision to sue. And he
did a good lawyer-like job and
won.
The story would be good
enough if it ended right there.
It would be a nice lesson for
law students to learn: try to be a
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peacemaker first, but if your
chent determines to fight, then be
a good advocate for that cUent’s
position. Ah, but the true beauty
of the tale lies in the coda. Lin
coln persisted in his
effort at reconcihation because
that was the way of virtue. He
did it, though, in a way that
respected his client and even
respected the ways of the world.
Apparently, the two relatives
were reconciled, but humbly
dechned Lincoln’s invitation to
set the fee, and so Lincoln said to
them: “Well, gentlemen, don’t you
think I have honestly earned
twenty-five dollars?’’ Clearly he
earned his fee both as the world
works and as a virtuous man.

THE CENTER FOR
PROFESSSIONAL
ETHICS
at C.W.R.U
Robert P. Lawry
Director
Jeanmarie Gielty
Department Assistant and
Editor

The
Center
for
Professional Ethics at
Case Western Reserve
University
provides
opportunities
for
students,
faculty,
administrators
and
professionals to explore
more fully the foundations
of
personal
and
professional ethics.

We encourage you to Join.
No doubt the world is a hard
Please fill out the form
place, full of anger and bitterness,
on the back page of the
sometimes putting brother against
newsletter.
brother-in-law. What
to do about it remains
CONFUSED?
a choice or a series of
choices. No one
es, this is the same Center
suggests those choices
for Professional Ethics
are always easy. StiU,
newsletter you have gotten
it helps to have a
for years. But perhaps you’ve
model or two to be a
noticed
the title reads that this is
touchstone when
the first issue? In honor of our our
money and power
new look and substantial changes,
seem to be what the
we have dubbed this issue “Volume
world is all about.
1, Issue 1.” However, this is merely
Sometimes, when you
a
continuation and expansion. You
step off of first base,
will still find the same quality
youjustgeta good
information that CPE has been
lead, heading, ulti
suppying to you for years within
mately, for home. ♦

Y

these new pages.
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PHYSICIAN-ASSISTSED SUICIDE: MORALLY
PERMISSIBLE?
“It’s a structured, formal argu
ment that I am going to present
to you,” said Dr. Richard
Momeyer, Professor of Philoso
phy from Miami University, as
he spoke to the Ethics fellows
at the Glidden House on May 6,
1998, “and then I am going to
elaborate on the premises that
are problematic. Then you are
going to help me figure out
where it is really problematic.”
It was with this introduction
that Dr. Momeyer began his
discussion on the moral justifi
cation for physician-assisted
suicide.

morally permissible for some
one else to help one die.
5. Whoever helps someone to
die must be competent to do so
in the most benign way pos
sible.
6. Physicians uniquely have this
competence.
THE CONCLUSION; There
are instances in which physi
cian-assisted suicide is morally
permissible.

“To make sense of this claim
[the first premise], we need a
distinction between biological
Dr. Momeyer began with listing
life and biographical life, or
six premises that would lead up
between merely being alive and
to a conclusion. The conclu
having a life. Merely to be alive
sion was that there are some
is to have the sort of life all
instances in which physicianliving organisms have, inte
assisted suicide is morally
grated biological functioning.
permissible. The six premises
But to HAVE a life requires
are as follows;
much more; it requires history,
character and narrative; having
1. A person can outlive his or
a life involves having projects,
her life.
interests, activities, aspirations,
2. When a person outlives life, it relationships and everything
else that goes into making up
is in one’s best interest to die.
the unique narrative of a life,”
explained Dr. Momeyer. “It’s
3. When it is in one’s best
interest to die (and certain other not just human beings that have
lives, but it’s human beings we
conditions are met), it is mor
are most interested in.”
ally permissible to choose
death.
“While it is the case that all of
4. If it is morally permissible to
us lose our lives (in both
choose death for oneself, it is
senses) at death, it is an un

Center for Professional Ethics

happy fact that some people
lose their lives (biographical)
while still living (biologically).
For these folks, victims of all
manner of injury, disease or ill
fate,” said Dr. Momeyer, “to
stay alive without having a life
can be extremely burdensome,
or if not burdensome, then at
least tragic. If the loss of
biographical life is irrevocable,
there would seem little point to
sustaining biological living. So
in this case, a person can outlive
his or her life.”
Dr. Momeyer then gave four
examples which all fall under
neath the heading of “it being in
one’s best interest to die.” He
noted the problematic that it
would be in one’s best interest
to die. “We have first to get
past the paradox of supposing
that being dead can, in any
sense, be in one’s interest ordinarily we talk about a
person’s interest while they are
living, vital, viable human
beings. Becoming dead may be
in one’s best interest in just this
sense; that present living and its
continuation is so unbearable
that it’s termination is reason
ably preferred.
Given a choice between dying
now and dying at some unspeci
fied, but near future, time, it is
quite clear that for some
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people, an earlier death rather
than a later one would be in
their interest,” he explained.
He then said “it might sensibly
be said that it is in my interest
now, while alive, to be dead; if
certain conditions are met.” He
then gave the example of a man
being trapped beneath a burning
truck full of gasoline. The fire
is rushing towards him and he
begs an police officer to shoot
him before he gets burned.
There is no prospect of being
rescued. The question is
whether or not it’s right for the
policeman to shoot him. Dr.
Momeyer concluded that it was
certainly plausible to suppose
that the man is better off being
dead 30 seconds earlier than he
will be otherwise.
“Most people take a genuine
interest in certain other people,
and even in “causes” larger than
themselves which they are
willing to sacrifice some of their
own narrow, egocentric selfinterest. These might be altruis
tic sacrifices, if we understand
altruism not necessarily as a
sacrifice of one’s self-interest,
but as an expression of a differ
ent kind of interest one has,
then there might be a way to
construe how it is out of one’s
concern for others that one
would prefer to be dead or be
better off dead than alive,”
remarked Dr. Momeyer.
Dr. Momeyer used Ronald

going on (i.e. if one is coma
Dworkin’s distinction which is
tose), being in such a state and
not between egocentric and
the impact this has on others we
non-egocentric interests, but
between experiential and critical care about is an offense to our
sense of dignity and what we
interests. “In his book. Life’s
believe
life should be.”
Dominion. Dworkin character
izes a
Dr. Momeyer then
person’s
“....it
is
quite
posed
the question;
experien
when is death earlier
tial inter
clear that for
rather than later in
ests as
some people,
one’s best interests?
being
The circumstances he
those that
an earlier
relayed to the group
are con
death
rather
are “where the costs
nected to
of continued living are
what
than a later
simply beyond bear
experi
one
would
be
ing, or the return for
ences we
bearing great pain and
like to
in their
suffering does not, in
have.
interest.”
the person’s view who
Such
is bearing pain and
experi
suffering, warrant prolonging
ences may be sensual and
such discomfort. These costs
bodily, but they may also be
intellectual, social, emotional or may be too great to bear for
any other experience people are ourselves, egocentrically or
capable of having,” he reported. experientially, or if we are
prepared to allow altruism, too
Dr. Momeyer then described
Dworkin’s definition of “critical great for those we care about to
interests.” He said that critical bear.” “Equally, “ he continued,
“if we find ourselves in a state
interests are mainly interests
that make life genuinely better. that offends our view of what
life should be, we may judge
death to be preferable to contin
“Our convictions or values,
about what makes life good are ued living.”
of this sort. What Dworkin’s
“That much said,” he warned,
distinction offers us is an
“it must be acknowledged that
additional reason for thinking
none of us determines our limits
death could be in our critical
interest, mainly, that continued for unbearable suffering or
meaningless existence in the
living would be a violation of
abstract. We do so while
what we value as a good life,
experiencing
what becomes, at
that even if we are not aware of
some point, if it does at all, no
the biological living that is
continued on page 6
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Physician-Assisted Suicide
continued from page 5

longer endurable and we do so
as socially connected creatures.
What we can endure is very
much determined by others; by
others functioning as
caregivers, healers, comforters,
family members, friends and
lovers. Even the very worst
suffering is, and ought to be,
mitigated by skilled health care
and when available, the love of
others. For some people,
probably most people, skilled
care, family connections and
abiding friendships are just what
keeps the worst pain and most
humiliating or hopeless circum
stances from becoming unen
durable.”
Dr. Momeyer reported that very
few suicides or other choices
for death are rational or really
in one’s own best interest no
matter if we understand those
interests as egocentric or non
egocentric, experiential or
critical. He said even fewer
suicides genuinely benefit
others. “Quite to the contrary,”
he said, “survivors are left
emotionally devastated. Surely
for most suicides, even suicide
attempts, thinking is distorted,
judgment is warped, and the
prospects of deceiving oneself
about the interest of others at a
time when one’s own self
regard has perhaps bottomed
out, are every bit as great as
they are for deceiving oneself
about his/her own interests.”

“All this suggests that we
should be extra cautious and
especially suspicious of claims
made by those seeking death
that their motivation is in part
or wholly to benefit others,”
asserted Dr. Momeyer. “Even
the most rational and wellgrounded desire for death when
predicated on serving the
interests of others might best be
rejected just because making
this judgment about the inter
ests of others at a time when
one’s own death may be immi
nent is too likely to be errone
ous.” To further explain this
issue. Dr. Momeyer used
Dworkin’s notion that “one
might prefer death to continued
living because it would better
satisfy one’s OWN interests,
one’s own critical interests, for
example - in the memories of
oneself left behind - would be
more useful.”
In moving on to the next
premise, “It is morally permis
sible to choose death,” Dr.
Momeyer acknowledged the
problematical notions of “mor
ally permissible” and “choose
death.” “The issue, as I am
attempting to frame it, is one
about what choices and actions
are morally permissible, not
necessarily with what’s morally
good, what would be better to
do, what’s best to do, or alter
natively, even what’s morally
right to do. Morally permissible

includes those choices for death
that are justifiable in the sense
of being “good” or “right”, if
there are such,” said Dr. Mom
eyer. He then added, “But it
also includes those choices for
death that are either excusable
or merely morally tolerable.
This weaker sense of justified
choices for death, which I’ll
simply call morally permissible
will suffice for the purposes of
this discussion.”
Dr. Momeyer admitted that to
choose death looks like a
weasely euphemism.” He
conceded, “If someone prefers
harsher language, for example
‘kill,’ I wouldn’t necessarily
object, so long as we remember
the argument is expressly
directed at physician-assisted
suicide, perhaps extendible to
voluntary euthanasia. I take
physician-assisted suicide to be
a notion and practice distinct
from euthanasia or an unas
sisted suicide. I prefer [the
phrase] ‘choose death’ for this
reason.”
He further explained, “The kind
of death or killing that we are
considering is a very deliberate,
intentional choice of death
made by the person who will
die. It is not done in isolation
and it necessarily involves the
participation of at least one
other moral agent in its com
mission. For these reasons it

mm
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seems to me accurate and
appropriate to speak of ‘choos
ing death.’ This phrase, far
more than ‘choose death,’ does
pack in a great deal; perhaps it
even risks begging a good many
important questions. So I’ll
attempt some unpacking.”
“Premise 3, in it’s entirety, reads
as follows: when it is in one’s
best interest to die (and certain
other conditions are met), it is
morally permissible to choose
death,” stated Dr. Momeyer.
“The only condition expressly
identified as necessary to justify
a choice for death is that the
choice be in one’s best interest.
Clearly, more than this is re
quired and still more is desir
able.”
He then added, “I would argue
that there are three primary,
even necessary, conditions that
must be met before a choice of
physician-assisted suicide is
morally permissible. In addition
to such a choice being in a
person’s best interest, it must

also be the case that the person
is fully competent and ad
equately informed, thereby
making as free a choice as
human beings are capable of
making.”
Dr. Momeyer defined this as
“competence consisting of
relatively unimpaired normal
mental functioning or awareness
of self, place, time and the like.”
He also observed that “episodic
mild confusion is not abnormal,
and not usually counted as
evidence of incompetence;
competence, rather than a
threshold notion, is usually
defined negatively by what it
excludes.” Dr. Momeyer went
on to explain that “informed
consent, in this content, is not
particularly problematic either.”
“Chiefly,” he concluded, “it
requires understanding the
consequences of choice, and
ideally informed consent would
be wholly rational. But it takes
no special expertise nor philo
sophical talent to knowledge

“The kind of death or killing that
we are considering is a very de
liberate, intentional choice of
death made by the person who
will die.”

ably consent to something.”
“Further criteria for a morally
permissible choice for physi
cian-assisted suicide are that a
competent, informed and selfinterested choice for death
should also be one that is made
by a grievously suffering,
terminally ill individual,” he
pointed out. “That the choice
for an early death is an authen
tic reflection of one’s values
and expression of real human
dignity. That one is respectful
of the sensibilities of others and
one’s act violates no overriding
moral obligations to others.
None of these has the same high
status as competence, informed
[decision making] and selfinterest. Under conceivable
circumstances, each, perhaps
all, could be overwritten. The
more of these criteria that are
fulfilled, and the greater degree
to which they are satisfied, the
more we should be confident
that the killing or the death that
occurs, is morally permissible.”
“The last two criteria I have
suggested are to prepare those
closest to oneself for the exer
cise of this choice, and that
carrying out the killing, no
overriding moral obligations are
violated,” explained Dr.
Momeyer. “A stronger crite
rion would be to seek the
concurrence, or even approval
of others before choosing death.
continued on page 8
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Physician-Assisted Suicide
continued from page 7

This would be too strong, I
agents of death, supposing them
think, to show due regard or
to have extraordinary obliga
due respect for the individual’s
tions to preserve life and never
own judgment. It should suffice to deliberately end it. I think
to have some open conversation this last view is quite mistaken,
and exploration of
but can’t
how one has come
For further reading Dr argue the
to think that death
Momeyer recommends: point here.”
now is best, and
Physician Assisted Suicide: “In the final
to be open to be
Expanding the Debate. analysis,”
dissuaded, by
edited by Margaret Pabst
expressions of
Battin, Rosamond Rhodes concluded
concern, and even
Dr. Mom
and Anita Silvers.
self-interest, by
eyer,
others. It’s a
Regulating How We Die: The “which
matter of respect
physicianEthical. Medical and Legal
ing the interests
Issues______Surrounding assisted
and sensibilities of Physician-Assisted Suicide. suicides we
those we care
edited by Linda Emanuel.
find morally
about to have
permissible
such conversa
will very
tions however difficult that may much turn on specific accounts
be.”
of lives and circumstances, of
interests and reasons, and of
“I assume that premises 4, 5
respect for others. Much will
and 6 of the argument this
depend upon how we assess the
paper began with are relatively
kinds of stories told; i.e. the
unproblematic,” proposed Dr.
stories told by compassionate
Momeyer. “It would be diffi
physicians such as Timothy
cult to make a case that some
Quill about his long term
thing it was morally permissible patient, Diane, suffering from
for someone to do became
leukemia, wanting release, and
obtaining from Quill a prescrip
morally impermissible when
they got help in doing it. Even
tion for a lethal does of barbitu
less worrisome is the supposi
rates. Equally, those stories of
tion that someone helping
unbearable suffering as told by
another should be competent to
[the people] themselves or their
do so, and when bringing about advocates will move us or not.
death is the task, that doctors
However, powerful and influen
are especially able. Many
tial such stories may be, by
would object to the appropri
themselves that will not suffice
ateness of physicians being the
for showing the moral
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permissibilty for some acts of
physician-assisted suicide. For
that, we need, I respectfully
submit, the sorts of distinctions,
arguments and criteria offered
here. ♦

Tom Anderson
continued from page 1

In January, he will become the
Executive Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer of The
Salk Institute for Biological
Studies in La Jolla, California.
“However,” he added, “I will
continue to maintain and always
have a relationship with the
Center for Professional Ethics.”
In March 1998, Tom was
featured in a story in The
Cleveland Plain Dealer. This
article focused on his career
break and decision to take a
degree at Harvard. Anderson
told The Plain Dealer that his
colleagues were shocked that he
would leave such a lucrative
position in order to pursue
graduate school. He continued
by saying, “I chose divinity school
because it seemed to make sense
to pull together some of the
interests that my wife and I have:
the overlap of religion, ethics and
public life.”
Taking this step took a lot of
planning and support from his
family. His wife, Rosalie Tyner,
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In Memorium:
MARLILN SAMUELS, 1996 Fellow

We mourn the passing of 1996 Ethics Fellow and Faculty member Marilyn
Schauer Samuels, who died June 26, 1998 from a heart attack attributed to
complications of diabetes.
Dr. Samuels joined CWRU in 1976 as an assistant professor of English. She
was the director of the Professional Writing Program and taught 18"' century
literature. In 1997, she received an award from “Mortar Board”, a student
service organization, for the difference she made in students’ lives. Dr.
Samuels also chaired the CWRU’s Arts and Sciences Curriculum
Committee in 1997-1998.

Marilyn Samuels

Dr. Samuels had begun exploring a specialty in literature and medicine before her death, and will be included in
a-soon-to-be-published anthology of writing surrounding disabilities from the University of Michigan Press.
Her contribution to this upcoming anthology focuses on “the betrayal of the body in chronic illness.” Her
published work includes two books on writing. The Technical Writing Process and Writing the Research
Paper.
Dr. Samuels graduated cum laude from Hunter College in 1965, and continued her studies there until she
earned her M.A. in English in 1969. She received her Ph.D. in English from the City University of New York
in 1973. She is survived by her son, David J. Samuels.
Marilyn was an enthusiastic and witty colleague whose courage and compassion will long be remembered by
all privileged enough to know and work with her. ❖

Tom Anderson
continued from page 9
told Tom “to follow his heart and
take a risk rather than continue
to do what is rational and
logical.”
Anderson said he was “getting a
degree in great ideas,” and since
he began the program at the
Divinity School he feels he has
become a very different person.
He told the paper, “Going back
to a rigorous academic
experience with interesting
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people and fascinating faculty
members simply clears the
cobwebs of the mind and really
changes one’s perspective.”
He added, “Fear and inertia are
the wicked partners that rob us
of life’s opportunities at any age,
but perhaps never more than
when we are middle-aged. Fear
of change, the unknown, of
unusualness, or failure, or of
looking foolish is a motivator for
remaining anchored in a familiar
place, doing familiar things.

Inertia, a tendency to remain in a
fixed condition without change,
becomes the operative condition
when apprehension defines the
middle years. My message is as
simple as this: It can be done.”
In addition, when Tom was asked
to comment on the Center for
Professional Ethics, past and
present, he said simply, “There is
no question that the Center and
Bob Lawry have helped to shape
my interest in ethics. My
interest in ethics has continued to
grow over the last 20 years; and
for that, I am very thankful.” <♦
Center for Professional Ethics
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.-'-'EVENTS
< AT C.W.R.U.
SYMPOSIUM ON
RESPONDING TO
ALLEGATIONS OF
RESEARCH
MISCONDUCT
The is the first of what are to be
a CWRU Colloquia for Ethics
in Research/Academic Life
hosted by Caroline Whitbeck,
Elmer G. Beamer-Hubert H.
Schneider Professor in Ethics in
the Department of Philosophy.
This October 29-30,1998 sym
posium will focus on procedures
for handling allegations of mis
conduct, to the sorts of acts that
count as misconduct, the line
between acts that constitute "re
search misconduct" in the tech
nical sense that triggers the
oversight of government/und
ing agencies, and other related
wrong doing, which research in
stitutions must control because
it undermines the trust necessary
for research to thrive.
The symposium begins on Oc
tober 29,1998 with a showing
of the film “Do Scientists

Center for Professional Ethics

CONFERENCES
Cheat?” and afterwards, a discus
sion with Professor Whitbeck.
The two showings for the film on
October 29th are as follows:

THE 1999
COMMUNITARIAN
SUMMIT

11:30 a.m.-l:30 p.m. in the Spar
tan Room of Thwing Center.

will be held February 27-29,
1999 at the National Airport
4:30 p.m.- 6:30 p.m. in room 411 Hilton in Washington, DC. The
of White Hall (in the Olin Build Summit will be held jointly with
the Association for Practical and
ing).
Professional Ethics (APPE).
On October 30,1998, there are
three separate discussions, all tak Some sessions on
ing place in either rooms 13 or Communitarian Thinking:
14 of Crawford Hall lead by Pro
* Communitarianism as a Social
fessor Whitbeck.
Philosophy
10 a.m.-12 p.m. “What Should
Go Into Procedures for Handling
Misconduct?”
1:30 p.m.- 3:30 p.m. “Standards
of Responsible Behavior in Data
Collection and Interpretation.”
3:45 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. “Standards
of Fair Credit and Authorship.”

* Moral Dialogue, Reasoned
Deliberations, and Culture Wars
* Social Norms, Internalization,
and Persuasion
* Communitarian Economics
Sessions on Public Policies
from Communitarian Perspec
tives:

The symposium is open and free
to the public. For more informa * The Second Amendment *
tion please contact Jude Durdella Social Responsibilities of the
Media and the Legal Profession
at 216-368-0528.
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If you are interested in sub
mitting a paper or organizing
a session, please send a brief
description to:

Vanessa Wight
The Communitarian Network,
2130 H St., NW, Suite 714J,
Washington, DC 20052.
Registration is $90 before
December 15, 1998; $120
thereafter. Members of
The Communitarian Network
will receive a 30% discount.
Fellowships are available.

theme and on other topics
concerning philosophy and
technology. The two-page
abstracts to be submitted by
October 12, 1998. The notifi
cation of abstract acceptance
by December 15, 1998.
send abstracts to:

Deborah G. Johnson, School of
Public Policy,
Ivan Allen College
Georgia Institute of Technology
Atlanta, Georgia 30332-0345
Or by e-mail: johnsd@rpi.edu

DEGREES

Papers invited on conference
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If you would like to know
more about tbe MAIS degree
in Applied Ethics, contact:

Director of Graduate Studies
Dept, of Philosophy
Oregon State University
Hovland Hall 208
Corvallis, OR 97331

PAPERS
The 11th Biennial International
Conference of the Society for
Philosophy and Technology in
conjunction with the Society
for Philosophy and Geography
on July 14-17,1999 in Silicon
Valley/San Jose, California has
issued a CALL FOR PAPERS
The conference theme is Tech
nological Spaces.

core courses in ethical theory
and philosophy, courses and
practicums in an applied ethics
area (Ethics and Natural Re
source or Ethics and the Profes
sions), and special courses in a
complementary discipline. The
program is capped by a master’s
thesis or project which is
mentored by Philosophy faculty.

Phone: 541/737-2955
Fax: 541/737-2571
Email: phil.grad@orst.edu
http://www.orst.edu/Dept/
philosophy

The Master of Arts in Interdis
ciplinary Studies (MAIS)
degree in Applied Ethics pro
vides graduate studies with indepth understanding of ethics in
today’s world. The program
explores the ethical issues and
challenges that advancements in
science and technology present
to informed citizens and science
professionals. Students take

Center for Professional Ethics

Center for

P

Ethics
ROFESSIONAL
at case western reserve university

10900 Euclid Avenue
C.W.R.U. 233 Yost Hall
Cleveland, Ohio
44106-7057

MEMBERSHIP
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

NAME______________________________________
ADDRESS___________________________________
CITY______________ STATE______________ ZIP.
PHONE_______________

SCHOOL________

SEND TO:
Center for Professional Ethics
233 Yost Hall
C.W.R.U.
10900 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, Ohio 44106-7057
i.

Membership:
GENERAL $25.00
STUDENT $5.00

